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In his article ‘The Politics of Utopia’ Frederic Jameson suggests that the present climate 
appears unpropitious for utopian theorising.  He points out that the explanation for this 
may lie in the ‘extraordinary historical dissociation’ of two distinct worlds that 
characterizes globalization today: 
 
‘In one of these worlds, the disintegration of the social is so absolute—misery, 
poverty, unemployment, starvation, squalor, violence and death—that the 
intricately elaborated social schemes of utopian thinkers become as frivolous as 
they are irrelevant. In the other, unparalleled wealth, computerized production, 
scientific and medical discoveries unimaginable a century ago as well as an 
endless variety of commercial and cultural pleasures, seem to have rendered 
utopian fantasy and speculation as boring and antiquated as pre-technological 
narratives of space flight.’1 
 
Jameson’s point, in part at least, was clearly not that different people may stand in 
different temporal relations to the ‘other world’ that a utopian theorist may attempt to 
conjure into existence (that some may be closer, others more distant from that ideal), but 
that the temporal horizon is in fact a spatial one – for some, in certain parts of the world, 
the idea of a life without poverty, disease, malnutrition and the like, renders utopian 
speculation utterly lifeless, whereas for others, in other places, that speculation appears 
little more than a faintly modified description of daily life.  What Jameson’s description 
of the apparent sterility of utopian discourse thus appears to communicate is two things.  
First is a dissipation of the sense of time or history in what he takes to be the post-
modern experience in late capitalism (underpinned by its refutation of narratives of 
progress, and stories of development and fruition).  Second, is a coeval concretisation of 
a spatial differentiation between the experience and outlook of different people in 
different places, in which each potential protagonist is locked into an imaginative stasis.  
 
Jameson’s argument was by no means directed towards the contemporary discourse of 
human rights, let alone that accompanying the recognition of economic, social and 
cultural rights (what I will refer to henceforth as ‘social rights’).  But his comments have 
some resonance in that context nevertheless.  Here, from one perspective, social rights 
embody a kind of reformist agenda (linked to a progressive narrative of ‘development’) 
that has particular purchase or meaning for those living in poverty or destitution in 
certain parts of the world, but which is ultimately confronted by an array of obstacles 
ranging from those concerning the inadequacies of local systems of governance and 
social order, to those that condition the international environment (such as might relate 
to trade, investment, debt or technology).  From another perspective, by contrast, the 
social rights agenda appears far more mundane – concerned as it appears to be with the 
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staples of political debate in modern democratic societies (health, education, equality etc), 
and to which the language of ‘rights’ seems to have very little positive to add. 
 
Within this debate, the question of space – or more specifically territory – seems to 
assume a significant place.  Those, for whom the social rights agenda appears too remote, 
see the difficulties as lying largely beyond the confines of the nation state: domestic 
political or social reform always appears possible, whilst international reform seems 
inconceivable.  Those, by contrast who see the project as mundane, do so largely by 
refusing to engage with the possibility that their lives may be somehow connected to 
those living in poverty elsewhere in the world (that the accrual of wealth and resources in 
the North is unconnected to their lack in the South).  And it is, thus, in respect of the 
existence or otherwise of international (or extraterritorial) obligations in respect of social 
rights that much appears to depend.   
 
In the course of this chapter I want to explore the significance of the ideas of space or 
territory for the contemporary understanding of social rights. In the process, I will touch 
upon the debate surrounding the imposition of economic sanctions and the position 
adopted, in respect of the question of extraterritoriality, by the United Nations (UN) 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  But the main focus will be to place 
the discussion of extraterritoriality and its relation to justificatory arguments about social 
rights in the context of the Arendt’s critique of the ‘Rights of Man’ as it has been 
developed in the work of Agamben and Balibar.  It will be argued that the Arendt’s 
warning that the advancement of human rights might justify processes of exclusion and 
dispossession at precisely the same moment at which it opposes them, retains 
considerable force for the contemporary social rights project, particularly when the latter 
is understood in purely national terms. 
 
Two points ought to be made, at the outset, about the title of this chapter.  First of all, 
although I use the term ‘dispossession’ in relation to the non-enjoyment of social rights I 
do not intend by that to restrict analysis to those instances in which individuals or 
communities may have been deprived of some existing (legal) entitlement, but I also 
include within it the simple condition of ‘being in poverty or destitution’ (however 
problematic those terms may be).  Dispossession remains the preferred terminology, 
however, insofar as it appears peculiarly expressive of the idea that poverty and 
destitution are not merely natural ‘Malthusian’ occurrences, but rather are socially 
generated and may themselves be produced through the legal relations of entitlement and 
exchange to which the narrower definition might refer.  Secondly, dispossession is 
referred to as an act of ‘violence’.  The purpose here, is to direct attention to two 
plausible equivalences: one between the kinds of act that are typically regarded as violent 
(the use of force or coercion), and those that result form other ‘technologies of power’ 
(social organisation and legal entitlements perhaps); the other between the consequential 
physical manifestation of each (for which a differentiation between physical pain and 
starvation, for example, is clearly problematic).  To see poverty as violence, in other 
words, is to forefront both the catastrophic nature of poverty and the extent to which it 
is managed or produced through social, political, economic, or legal arrangements. 
 
 
Part I. 
 
In December 1997, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, issued 
a general comment on the ‘relationship between economic sanctions and respect for 
economic, social and cultural rights’.2  The main purpose of that general comment was to 
encourage the UN Security Council, and member states participating in its decision-
making, to spend more time considering the impact that such sanctions may have upon 
the economic, social and cultural rights of the inhabitants of ‘target’ regimes.  It was an 
issue that had been brought to the Committee’s attention in several state reports,3 and 
had assumed particular prominence in the case of Iraq.  A number of studies that had 
been undertaken by the World Health Organisation (WHO), amongst others, in 
assessing the impact of the sanctions regime on Iraq in the aftermath of the first Gulf 
War,4 indicated that whilst the UN had moved to mitigate the adverse effects of its 
sanctions regime – particularly through its operation of the ‘Oil for Food’ programme5 – 
the imposition of sanctions had had a catastrophic effect upon the health and well-being 
of the Iraqi population.  There were undoubtedly causal questions here relating to the 
relationship between the sanctions imposed and the consequential effects (for example, 
the extent to which humanitarian assistance was being diverted for the profit of the local 
elite) but even with such qualifications, the evidence was clear enough to suggest that the 
compatibility of sanctions regimes with states’ commitments under the UN Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights could not be taken for granted.6 
 
If the Committee felt itself compelled to respond to the issue – to point out, at least, that 
economic sanctions, if not carefully targeted, structured and monitored, might constitute 
something analogous to the deliberate starvation of the population, or the purposeful 
deprivation of medical assistance – there was the inevitable question as to how it might 
do so within the framework of the obligations under the Covenant itself.  There were 
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always have unintended or unwanted effects. They can complicate the work of humanitarian agencies by 
denying them certain categories of supplies and by obliging them to go through arduous procedures to 
obtain the necessary exemptions.  They can conflict with the development objectives of the Organization 
and do long-term damage to the productive capacity of the target country.  They can have a severe effect 
on other countries that are neighbours or major economic partners of the target country.  They can also 
defeat their own purpose by provoking a patriotic response against the international community, 
symbolized by the United Nations, and by rallying the population behind the leaders whose behaviour the 
sanctions are intended to modify’. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, (1995), UN doc. S/1995/1, para. 70.  
two obvious difficulties.  First of all, there was a general question concerning the 
applicability of the Covenant in case of sanctions duly authorised by the Security Council 
acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter insofar as Article 103 of the Charter 
provides that, in case of conflict, obligations under the Charter should prevail over those 
under any other international agreement.  Secondly, and in some respects more 
fundamentally, there was a question as to whether state obligations under the Covenant 
extended extra-territorially to the point at which a state imposing sanctions might be held 
responsible for any consequential deprivation (of the right to food or health care for 
example) even if the sanctioning state exercised no formal jurisdiction or control over the 
population concerned.  Whilst the question whether the effect of Security Council 
resolutions is to automatically nullify inconsistent conventional obligations is certainly of 
some general importance7, it is with respect to the second of these issues that this paper 
is concerned. 
 
The Covenant itself, unlike the majority of other human rights treaties, makes no explicit 
mention of its scope of application.  Whereas article 2(1) of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights speaks of the obligation of states to respect and ensure the 
rights of all individuals ‘within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’, the parallel 
provision in Article 2(1) of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights avoids 
any reference to ‘jurisdiction’ or ‘territory’.  It does, however, impose an obligation upon 
all States to ‘take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation’ 
with a view to achieving the full realisation of the rights recognized on a progressive 
basis.  The reference to international cooperation, here, is further reiterated in several 
other articles (such as Articles 11(2) and 15(4)), and it is ‘agreed’ under the terms of 
Article 23 that ‘international action for the achievement of the rights recognized’ should 
include ‘such methods as the conclusion of conventions, the adoption of 
recommendations, the furnishing of technical assistance and the holding of regional 
meetings and technical meetings for the purpose of consultation and study’.8  Whilst 
clearly implying that states parties assume certain obligations of an external or 
international nature, the exhortation to ‘cooperate’ does not appear to go very far beyond 
a commitment to participate in certain types of international activity of a humanitarian 
character (such as through the provision of a certain amount of aid or assistance to a 
number of undefined states).  It certainly leaves open the larger question as to whether 
states parties may assume obligations directly in respect of individuals in third states.9     
 
Despite the absence of an unambiguous textual provision determining the nature and 
extent of extra-territorial obligations, the Committee in its General Comment on 
Sanctions reaffirmed what had largely been hinted at in its earlier practice10 concerning 
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the activities of international lending agencies and transnational corporations11 by 
asserting that States parties did assume certain substantive obligations of an extra-
territorial nature: 
 
‘Just as the international community insists that any targeted State must respect 
the civil and political rights of its citizens, so too must ... the international 
community itself do everything possible to protect at least the core content of the 
economic, social and cultural rights of the affected peoples of that State (see also 
General Comment 3 (1990), paragraph 10).’ 12 
 
States imposing sanctions thus were under an obligation to take economic, social and 
cultural rights fully into account when designing an ‘appropriate sanctions regime’,13 to 
monitor and protect those rights14 and take appropriate steps ‘in order to respond to any 
disproportionate suffering experienced by vulnerable groups within the targeted 
country’.15  The Committee’s general position in this respect has subsequently been 
reaffirmed in later practice.  In its General Comment on the Right to Food, for example, 
the Committee maintained that  
 
‘States parties should take steps to respect the enjoyment of the right to food in 
other countries, to protect that right, to facilitate access to food and to provide 
the necessary aid when required.’16 
 
This, implied, in the view of the Committee, not only an obligation to ‘refrain at all times 
from food embargoes or similar measures which endanger conditions for food 
production and access to food in other countries’, but also an obligation to ‘provide 
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of emergency’.17  Similarly in its 
General Comment on the Right to Water, the Committee insisted that States parties 
ensure that water is never used ‘as an instrument of political and economic pressure’, that 
they should ‘prevent their own citizens and companies from violating the right to water 
of individuals and communities in other countries’ and that, when acting as members of 
international organizations, should take steps to ensure that those organizations take the 
right to water into account in their various activities.18 
 
For all the Committee’s insistence that the Covenant does impose certain extraterritorial 
obligations upon states – at least as regards a duty to ‘respect’ or ‘protect’ the enjoyment 
                                                 
11 See e.g., General Comment No. 2 (1990), UN doc. E/C.12/1990/para. 9; General Comment No. 3 
(1990) UN doc. E/C.12/1990/, para. 13. 
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Fund (IMF) to incorporate a concern for economic, social and cultural rights more directly in their work. 
See e.g., General Comment No. 2; General Comment No.14, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, paras. 63-5; 
General Comment No. 15 (2002), UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, para. 60. 
of economic, social and cultural rights on the part of those living in other countries19 – 
the issue has clearly remained a contentious one.  In recent years, for example, the 
United States (US) has responded very sharply to the suggestion of the UN 
Commission’s Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food that states were burdened with a 
range of extraterritorial obligations in the fulfilment of that right.20  In the 2004 session 
of the UN Commission on Human Rights, for example, the US representative declared 
his support for the idea of the ‘progressive realization’ of the right to food, but 
emphasised categorically that such a right ‘did not give rise to international obligations’.21  
He suggested, furthermore, that the Special Rapporteur should be chastised for his 
‘irresponsible and unfounded statements’ in that regard.22 Similarly, in the 2006 session, 
the US representative again objected to the ‘novel legal assertions’ concerning 
extraterritorial obligations of states found in the Special Rapporteur’s reports on the right 
to food.23  Whilst the US may have been most vocal in this regard, it has not been alone. 
In critical votes on such issues in the Commission, the US was joined by several other 
Western European and Northern states, and a number of the same states raised similar 
concerns in debates surrounding the drafting of an Optional Protocol to the Covenant.24 
 
Although the question of the extraterritorial effect of the Covenant was briefly discussed 
by the International Court of Justice in the Legal Consequences case25 its conclusions really 
took the matter no further.  There the Court emphasised, in light of the position adopted 
by the UN Committee, that the obligations under the Covenant could be thought to 
extend to occupied territory, or territory otherwise falling within a state’s ‘jurisdiction’ 
albeit not under its sovereignty.26  But in this respect, it merely reprised the position that 
had otherwise been established in cases such as Loizidou,27 and gave little indication as to 
whether the Committee’s more general position regarding extraterritorial obligations was 
a sound one.  Ultimately, its explanation for the absence of a jurisdictional clause in the 
Covenant – namely that the guarantees were ‘essentially territorial’28 – tends to affirm the 
inference that extraterritorial obligations only exist in largely exceptional cases. 
                                                 
19 For an analysis of extraterritorial obligations in terms of the tripartite category of obligations see 
Coomans, supra, p. 7; Skogly S. & Gibney M., ‘Transnational Human Rights Obligations’, (2002)  24 Human 
Rights Quarterly, 781 
20 Ziegler J., ‘The Right to Food’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/47. 
21 Williamson (USA), E/CN.4/2004/SR.51, p. 16, para. 84. Comments made in respect of draft resolution 
E/CN.4/2004/L.24. 
22
 Ibid. 
23 Piedra (USA), E/CN.4/2005/SR.50, p. 17, para. 95. 
24 Report of Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/52, para. 76 (‘The representatives of 
the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Canada, France and Portugal believed that international 
cooperation and assistance was an important moral obligation but not a legal entitlement, and did not 
interpret the Covenant to impose a legal obligation to provide development assistance or give a legal title 
to receive such aid.’) 
25 Legal Conseqeunces of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories [2004] ICJ Rep para. 112. 
26 In case of Israel’s obligations with respect to the West Bank, therefore, it suggested that ‘the territories 
occupied by Israel have for over 37 years been subject to its territorial jurisdiction as the Occupying 
Power.  In the exercise of the powers available to it on this basis, Israel is bound by the provisions of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.’  Legal Consequences, para. 112. 
27 Loizidou v. Turkey, (1995) ECHR, Preliminary Objections, Series A. No. 310, para. 57.  Here, the 
European Court of Human Rights took the view that Turkey could be held responsible for acts of 
interference in the applicant’s enjoyment of her property rights in Northern Cyprus by reason of its 
‘effective control’ over that territory. 
28 The one provision which appears to support this interpretation is article 14 of the Covenant which 
provides that any state party which, at the time of becoming a Party ‘has not been able to secure in its 
metropolitan territory or other territories under its jurisdiction compulsory primary education, free of 
charge’ should formulate a plan for doing so. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is not to revisit the general arguments as to what might 
represent the most legitimate construction of the terms of the Covenant as regards 
‘international’ or ‘extraterritorial’ obligations, nor seek to articulate how sanctions may be 
made more ‘human rights friendly’.  Studies of that particular nature have been 
undertaken elsewhere.29  Rather, the purpose is to explore the significance of the notion 
of territorialism (which I take to be the idea that economic, social and cultural rights 
should be understood exclusively in terms of a relationship between a single sovereign 
and its subjects within a bounded space) for the project of economic, social and cultural 
rights as a whole.  The particular argument developed in this chapter is that a territorial 
conception of economic, social and cultural rights not only, and rather obviously, 
provides a convenient analytical space for the deployment of coercive economic 
measures internationally, but also, and more invidiously, puts into question the very 
rationale of economic, social and cultural rights.  It is suggested that whilst instruments 
for the protection of economic, social and cultural rights (for which I take the 
International Covenant to be paradigmatic) are built upon the premise that they may 
advance or substantiate the claims of the disempowered, marginalised or deprived, 
precisely that ‘community of the dispossessed’ is excluded from being able to represent 
themselves as rights-claimants when their experience is located within a specific territorial 
framework.  To put the argument in a different way, the cost of resistance to the idea of 
extraterritorial responsibility, is not simply an incidental one (one that may be articulated, 
for example, in terms of ‘collateral damage’, or ‘necessary suffering’) but rather a cost 
which may seriously prejudice any continued commitment to such rights. 
 
Part II 
   
In the development of my argument, I want to take as my starting point, Hannah 
Arendt’s critique of the rights of man in the Second Part of her work The Origins of 
Totalitarianism.30  As Balibar has subsequently suggested,31 Arendt famously inverted the 
terms of traditional political philosophy in two important ways.  First of all, Arendt 
brought to the fore – in terms reminiscent of Schmitt32 and, more recently, Agamben33 – 
the place of the excluded (and specifically the stateless) in the constitution of European 
politics in the early 20th Century.  She was to make clear that the inherited tradition of 
political philosophy in Europe came to be based upon, or function through, the 
exclusion of those who were not citizens and therefore lacked rights (those who were 
‘thrown back, in the midst of civilization, on their natural givenness’34), and in exposing 
                                                 
29 See e.g., Reinisch A., ‘Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security 
Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions’, (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 851; 
Joyner C., ‘United Nations Sanctions after Iraq: Looking Back to Look Ahead’, (2003) 4 Chinese Journal of 
International Law 329. 
30 Arendt H., The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt, San Diego, 1968) pp. 267-302 
31 Balibar E., We, The People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2004) pp. 117-8. 
32 Schmitt C. Political Theology (trans Schwab G; MIT Press, Cambridge Mass. and London, 1985).  Schmitt’s 
insight was to bring the concept of the ‘exception’ to the centre of political philosophy.  He thus defines 
the sovereign as ‘he who decides on the exception’ (pp. 5-7). 
33 Agamben G., Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995); id. State 
of Exception (trans. Attell K, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2004) 
34 Arendt, supra, n. 30 above, p. 302. 
the tragedy, she also exposed the fragility of the political order - particularly in terms of 
its capacity to resist the totalitarian urge.35 
 
In the second place, Arendt brought to the fore the relationship between human rights 
and political rights: whereas originally the former were thought to be the basis for the 
latter (the identification of universal rights preceding their articulation in particular 
constitutional documents), in Arendt’s view this relationship was subsequently reversed 
through the conflation of human rights with popular sovereignty: the enjoyment of civil 
rights, of membership in a community, thereafter came to be the basis for human rights 
(the condition under which rights might be enjoyed).36  The point, however, was not, as 
one might be inclined to suppose, that this was a case of ‘faulty transposition’ or a failure 
in the political project of emancipation, but rather a failure that cut to the heart of the 
humanitarian ideal.  As Arendt put it,  
 
‘the conception of human rights… based upon the assumed existence of a 
human being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who 
professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who 
had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships – except that they 
were still human’.37 
 
Arendt thus understood the value of being ‘human’ to which the idea of ‘human rights’ 
refers in a quite specific way.  For her, being ‘human’ was not something that connoted, 
as Hegel might have put it, the notion of seeking and enjoying recognition within society.  
Rather, it was the opposite: a quality that lacked specificity or particularity, a quality of 
being that was neither spatially nor temporally determinate, a quality that ensued from 
being excluded (whether internally or externally) from community.  What the quality of 
being ‘human’ lacked, above all else, was the ‘right to have rights’, and in that respect, the 
stateless were able to conceive of themselves as little more than savages awaiting 
civilisation. 
 
The central feature of Arendt’s critique in this respect – particularly as it has been 
conceived in the work of Agamben, Balibar and others - is the instrinsic relationship 
between the idea of human rights on the one hand and the categories of the nation-state 
on the other (citizenship/ sovereignty).  Agamben insists, for example, that: 
 
‘it is time to stop regarding declarations of rights as proclamations of eternal, 
metajuridical values binding the legislator (in fact, without much success) to 
respect eternal ethical principles, and to begin to consider them according to 
their real historical function in the modern nation-state.’38 
 
                                                 
35 Arendt was fiercely critical, in that respect, of the ‘liberal identification of totalitarianism with 
authoritarianism’ (Between Past and Future (Faber and Faber, London 1961) p. 97) and was keen to 
demonstrate the conditions under which democracy may move in precisely the same direction. 
36 She remarks ‘[t]he people’s sovereignty… was not proclaimed by the grace of God but in the name of 
Man, so that it seemed only natural that the “inalienable” rights of man would find their guarantee and 
become an inalienable part of the right of the people to self-government…. The whole question of human 
rights, therefore, was quickly and inextricably blended with the question of national emancipation; only the 
emancipated sovereignty of the people, of one’s own people, seemed to be able to insure them.’ Arendt, 
supra, n. 29 above, p. 291. 
37 Ibid, p. 299. 
38 Agamben, Homo Sacer, supra, n. 32 above, p. 127. 
For him, declarations of rights were the means by which ‘natural life’ was inscribed in the 
‘juridico-political order of the nation-state’ and became the ‘earthly foundation of the 
state’s legitimacy and sovereignty’.39  At the same time as sovereignty came to be based 
upon the assumed relationship between man and the citizen, birth and nationality, the 
figure of the refugee or the stateless immediately placed that ‘originary’  fiction in crisis.40  
For Agamben, the stateless were not merely as those who were incidentally excluded from 
the politics of the nation state, but were rather the central referent for Western 
‘biopolitics’.41  They represented, in his terms, the symbolic figure of the sacred person 
(homo sacer) whose perilous existence on the one hand recalled the juridical foundation of 
political society (to render secure the life of the individual within society), but whose 
insecurity was also, and paradoxically, produced through that legal-political order.  Homo 
sacer, understood as the person who may be ‘killed yet not sacrificed’ (whose body is 
regarded as sacred, yet whose exclusion from the political order is such as to allow them 
to be killed without punishment) thus represented the personification of a constitutive 
paradox within Western biopolitics. 
 
For present purposes, I am less concerned with exploring the complexities of this 
account of the underpinnings of sovereignty in the nation-state or the terms of the 
contemporary Western biopolitical order, than with developing a more simple idea, but 
one which is yet implicit in the work of Agamben and Arendt: that the humanitarian 
ideals that underpin the contemporary commitment to economic and social rights are put 
to the test precisely at those critical moments in which the individuals or communities 
who stand to be empowered, are themselves excluded from the discourse.  I adopt from 
Arendt, therefore, the idea that it is the socially peripheral – the marginalised, 
dispossessed or subaltern – who stand at the centre of any concern for social rights as 
part of a discourse of human rights.  I adopt from Agamben the idea that the exclusion 
of the socially peripheral from the enjoyment of rights may not only remain the cause for 
any continued commitment to social rights (in the sense that is their rights which are to 
be fulfilled), but may also be a product of the processes through which those rights have 
come to be legally articulated in the first place. 
 
Part III 
In order to understand the central place of this process of inclusion/exclusion within the 
framework of the discourse of social rights, it is necessary to step back once again into 
the realm of extraterritoriality.   In its most basic form, one might be inclined to take the 
view that the relationship between an individual and the state assuming authority over 
that individual is fully expressive of the content of the rights in question.  Just as, it might 
be argued, a state’s territorial sovereignty is exclusive, so also, it must have exclusive 
responsibility for the fulfilment of the rights of those that come within its jurisdiction or 
under its control.   In some ways this makes obvious sense – who else is going to take 
responsibility for education, housing or health care?  Who else may assume obligations 
here?  If there is a right to housing, then it surely only makes sense to say that it is 
opposable as against those who have the capacity to provide it.  To argue otherwise, is to 
move beyond the sanctified boundaries of moral agency, and maintain a view which is 
simply utopian.  Just as an ‘ought’ seems to imply a ‘can’, obligations must surely be built 
upon a contingent capacity.   
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Of course, pushed to its extreme, asserting an inextricable nexus between capacity and 
obligation may be such as to render the idea of economic, social and cultural rights 
largely incoherent – we are all too aware of the resource limitations that affect the 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights in many parts of the globe, and that 
prefiguring obligations by reference to any momentary capacity to fulfil them would not 
only undermine the conditions for their universality but would render that distribution 
immutable.  One finds in article 2(1) of the Covenant, therefore, the idea not merely that 
the realisation of social rights is dependent upon available resources, but also the idea 
that they should be realised in a progressive manner.42  The idea of progress thus brings 
into view, on the horizon, the possibility of universality (encapsulated in the idea of the 
‘full realization’ of social rights), through the unspoken medium of a change in the global 
distribution of resources.  It allows, thereby, a certain mediation between the idea that 
the contemporary global context precludes universal realisation of social rights, and the 
idea that there exists an immanent potential for their realisation.  Progressivism, to put it 
in a different way, seems to be a means of negotiating in, a temporal sense, between an 
apologia for destitution and a utopian fable of ‘rights enjoyment’. 
 
This temporal separation between present and future, however, does not overcome the 
difficulties associated with the relationship between the imaginative ideal of rights-
fulfilment on the one hand and the particular constraints that face states committed to 
their realisation on the other.  The problem, here, arises most clearly when one seeks to 
articulate the terms of the relationship between rights and obligations within the 
Covenant.  In typical Hohfeldian terms,43 one might be inclined to insist that the content 
of all rights (including social rights) must be capable of being described in terms of 
correlative obligations: where there is no right there is no obligation and vice versa.  When 
describing that relationship by reference to the terms of Article 2(1) of the Covenant, 
however, certain difficulties arise: if the obligation is to realise the rights in a progressive 
manner, does that render the rights themselves ‘progressive’?  Might a state be capable of 
violating a procedural obligation (for example, in failing to establish a plan of action to 
implement the right to free primary education as required by Article 14) but yet not 
violate a substantive right?    
 
The aporia, here, is particularly evident when one comes to speak about social rights in 
terms of their violation.44  To illustrate the point, reference might be made to an 
introductory paragraph in the UN Committee’s General Comment on the Right to Water 
in which it made the following remark: 
 
‘The Committee has been confronted continually with the widespread denial of 
the right to water in developing as well as developed countries.  Over one 
billion persons lack access to a basic water supply, while several billion do not 
have access to adequate sanitation, which is the primary cause of water 
contamination and diseases linked to water.’45 
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As a justification for concerning itself with the question of access to water when 
considering state reports, the Committee might be forgiven for believing that the facts 
spoke for themselves.  But could the Committee rightly claim that lack of access to a 
basic water supply constituted a ‘widespread denial of the right to water’?  Surely, prior to 
any such claim, the Committee would have had to undertake an evaluation as to whether 
the states concerned had sufficient resources to make such water available, and whether 
their efforts at distribution were adequate in the circumstances.  Even if, as the 
Committee has maintained, states have an obligation to fulfil the ‘core content’ of rights 
(for which one supposes the Committee means a minimum essential level of 
enjoyment46) it is clear that the presence or absence of resources would still be relevant to 
the evaluation, and hence no categorical statement in that respect can be made merely on 
the facts themselves.47  There is, thus, an apparent disjunction between the proclamation 
of rights, on the one hand, and the contingent conditions for their fulfilment on the 
other – a disjunction that appears may only effectively be resolved in this context either 
by reformulating the rights (in the sense such as the ‘right to the progressive realisation 
of the right to housing, education’ etc), or by conceptually separating what it means to 
have a right on the one hand, and what it means to have an obligation on the other. 
 
The most obvious way of understanding this problem, however, is to think of the 
Committee as speaking about the rights in question in two different ways.  On the one 
hand is the legal conception of right – one whose fulfilment or denial is determined by an 
exhaustive evaluation of the circumstances and conditions in which it occurs (in 
accordance with the terms of Article 2(1) of the Covenant).  On the other hand is the 
idea of ‘right’ in a metajuridical, ethical, or ‘pre-legal’ sense whose referent is the 
metaphorical figure, or image of the starving child, the homeless family or the 
dispossessed community.  In this latter sense, one might be encouraged to speak of a 
person’s rights being denied or violated by virtue of the very fact of deprivation, and 
quite apart from any tangible legal chain of responsibility being identified. 
 
The key question, here, however, is what function is served by this metajuridical notion 
of right? What is its relationship to the legal conception of rights? Why should the UN 
Committee invoke that idea when seeking to articulate obligations incumbent upon states 
in the context of the right to water?  The answer appears plain enough.  Just as the idea 
of progress that lies at the heart of the articulation of obligations under the Covenant 
reaches out towards a (forever postponed) moment of ‘rights fulfilment’, so also it moves 
away from a dystopian understanding of contemporary society – one beset by disease, 
illness, malnutrition and homelessness.  That dystopia, however, is not (or at least not 
merely) a representation of some fictional past, cast back in order to give sense to the 
idea of progress or as an apology for institution building, but far more importantly as an 
idea that forms a central feature of arguments that justify the enunciation of rights in the 
first place.  Just as it is evident that a particular social context shaped the articulation of 
rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the two Covenants 
(excluding, for example, reference to minority rights or refugees, to the elderly or those 
with disabilities) so also an enduring and dynamic sense of injustice (the injustice of 
deprivation or loss of freedom), provides the continuing justification for resort to the 
language of human rights.   
 
At this point it becomes apparent that, as with the stateless in Arendt’s critique, the 
dispossessed become both central and marginal to the account of social rights.  They are 
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clearly central in the sense that they provide the continuing imperative for the articulation 
of rights claims.  Without the images of suffering or dispossession with which we are 
constantly confronted no universal project of social rights would plausibly be 
maintained.48  At the same time, however, the dispossessed are also evidently marginal in 
the sense that they are constantly one step away from being able to represent themselves 
as rights holders.  At every moment, they are faced with the impossibility of being 
‘claimants’ by virtue of the fact of destitution – having to precede any such claim by 
reference to some original enactment of ownership or by some evaluation as to the 
adequacy of social resources and the inadequacy of their distribution.  The destitute are 
thus the original category of the excluded – the category whose exclusion provides the 
constitutional impulse for the development of institutional initiatives for the protection 
and promotion of social rights, and the category whose continued exclusion is lamentably 
its point of immanent critique.  The violence of their destitution may thus be thought to 
be a privileged one, but also one that denies the sense of any such privilege. 
 
In some degree this bears upon a fundamental ambivalence within the category of 
‘victimhood’.  As Mutua has suggested, the presentation of human rights victims as a 
‘horde of nameless, despairing, and dispirited masses’49 is such as to view them as 
incapable of capacity for action or initiative and to present them as objects of possible 
intervention.  It obscures, thereby, the extent to which their capacity for action ‘may be a 
source of residual and ongoing pleasure: the pleasure of solidarity, the pleasure of 
expression, the pleasure of re-imagining the world’.50  The point being made here, 
however, is that these two different senses, or experiences, of victimhood (the passive 
sense of the victim as an ‘object of intervention’, the active sense of the victim as ‘agent’) 
are separated in the discourse of social rights.  In this context the dispossessed may be 
identified by others (states, non-governmental organisations etc) as the reason for action, 
and their plight the inducement for adoption of protective or ameliorative measures, but 
they are prevented in the terms of the existing discourse from presenting themselves as 
victims in the sense of having any entitlement to specific claims or capacity for legal 
agency. 
 
 
Part IV 
 
Thus far, I have sought to suggest that the exclusion of the dispossessed from the 
discourse of social rights follows from the immediate resource constraints that impinge 
upon the capacity of many governments to deal effectively with that dispossession, and 
have suggested that the discourse itself is imperilled as a consequence.  I have only 
hinted, however, at the relationship between this narrative of dispossession and the 
question of territoriality, and have largely left untouched the significance of territorial 
borders.  In the work of both Agamben and Balibar, the ‘excluded’ are seen to inhabit 
particular space – for Agamben it is the ‘camp’,51 for Balibar the urban ghetto, the 
detention zone, or more broadly, and figuratively, the ‘South’.  Balibar, in particular, is 
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vexed by the apparent multi-locational nature of ‘the border’ which, when taken to 
describe the boundaries of the demos (the ‘nondemocratic condition of democracy’),52 may 
come to be located on some occasions, in the ‘middle of political space’53 and, on others, 
outside the limits of a state’s formal jurisdiction. 
 
For present purposes, I am not so much concerned for the way in which borders are 
representative of the point at which the nature of coercive authority subtly changes 
character, (the point at which, as Balibar puts it ‘the status of citizens returns to the 
condition of a “subject”’54) but their role in excluding the dispossessed from being able 
to represent themselves, as such, in the language of social rights.  The conditions 
described above that underpin the inability of the dispossessed to speak of the violation 
of their rights are, in the main, a function of a territorial framework that ultimately 
encourages an association of poverty with the inadequacy, and/or mismanagement, of 
national resources.  When located within an exclusively national context, poverty and 
dispossession tend to be seen as local problems - problems associated with ‘lack of 
development’, economic mismanagement, corruption, or lack of knowledge or expertise 
– for which aid, development assistance, or other forms of international intervention 
may act as suitable palliatives.  In some respects, and as is emphasised in the work of Sen 
amongst others, questions of governance and the mechanics of local distribution will 
frequently be critical to an individual’s enjoyment of access to food, housing, water and 
other rights and freedoms.55 At the same time, however, the presentation of the problem 
in this way not only obscures the broader international context in which those problems 
are socially produced, but would also mean that the dispossessed would constantly be 
faced by the economic incapacity of their national governments, and hence only ever able 
to represent themselves as potential claimants or aspirational rights-holders.   
 
If the key condition that prevents the dispossessed from representing themselves as 
‘rights claimants’ is the problem of resource scarcity, then one way of avoiding that 
exclusionary framework is by broadening the horizons of the engagement.  It has long 
been fairly clear, that problems of dispossession (poverty, malnutrition etc) are not 
exclusively local – that they also implicate questions of trade, debt, or investment that 
may be configured within or through the international environment.  This much at least, 
was the insight of those proponents of the New International Economic Order and the 
Right to Development56 even if those projects are no longer the focus of sustained 
attention.  The importance of this emphasis upon the international environment, 
however, is found in the way it shifts the emphasis away from the problem of scarcity, 
and places greater importance instead upon the question of distribution.  The issue 
becomes, in other words, less a matter as to whether a particular government may have at 
its command, sufficient resources to ‘lift’ the dispossessed out of poverty, and rather 
more a matter of understanding the various, and multiple, ways in which both the local 
and international environment may condition an individual’s access to the necessary 
resources for their survival, well-being and active social agency.57  If that is the starting 
point, one may then think about resources on a global scale being available but unevenly 
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distributed, and thereby allow the dispossessed to speak of themselves literally in those 
terms - as having been dis-possessed of their rights rather than awaiting their conferral.   
 
An insistence upon the importance of the global context for an understanding of social 
rights is not, ultimately, a polemical rejection of local responsibility for problems of 
distribution or lack of access to resources or the means to ensure basic subsistence, nor 
an attempt to insist that the only response may be to hold accountable international 
actors (international financial institutions, multinational corporations, foreign 
governments) for the crises that affect millions around the globe.  Rather, and more 
simply, it is to observe that the conditions for legitimising the discourse of social rights 
necessarily involve placing the issues of poverty, disease or malnutrition within a global, 
rather than a local framework, so as to make possible the idea that the dispossessed are 
legitimate agents, capable of articulating meaningful claims on their own behalf.  Without 
this, it is hard to avoid Arendt’s conclusion that being ‘human’ for purposes of human 
rights, is to mean little other than being the object of an exclusionary politics. 
 
 
Part V  
In the course of this chapter I have suggested that, insofar as the debates concerning the 
question of extraterritorial obligations seem to suppose that one can readily demarcate 
between different realms of rights and responsibilities in the field of social rights (the 
internal/ external, the national / international), these configurations ultimately put in 
jeopardy any continued commitment to the discourse.  One response, of course, may be 
to suggest that the discourse itself is inherently problematic – that it attempts to 
depoliticise inherently ‘political’ struggles over the form or structure of public projects, 
over distribution of resources within a given society, or over the legitimacy of different 
kinds of social arrangements.  Framing such struggles in terms of individual rights, it 
might be argued, does little to advance the cause of those who are dispossessed (insofar 
as it fails to understand the issues as being social rather than strictly individual) and may 
ultimately be the cause of further dispossession (through the shifting of social resources 
away from other vulnerable groups or individuals).  At the same time, it is important to 
recognize that arguments advancing the idea that social rights ‘depoliticise’ issues of 
social contestation don’t go very far if they merely entail a call for such issues to be dealt 
with through existing political procedures rather than through judicial intervention, or if 
they are seen to emphasise the obvious fact that the values in question are themselves 
opaque.  Both of these might, in turn, be regarded as ‘depoliticising’ moves if their sense 
is such as to merely re-affirm the ongoing marginalisation of those who do not have 
access to social resources and whose voices are not heard within the current political 
order; and if one is looking towards the elaboration of a new brand of politics, then 
talking about social rights as a way of allowing the dispossessed to express their sense of 
injustice, or otherwise become active social and political agents, may not be quite so out 
of place.   
Another objection, of course, is that even if one may recognise the significance of the 
international context for purposes of maintaining a commitment to social rights, this is 
still confronted by the idea of sovereignty.  How might a state retain a simultaneous 
commitment to the idea that it has a domestic political constituency to which it is 
responsible, with the notion that it also has responsibility for the lives and livelihood for 
those living beyond its borders?  As both Agamben and Balibar intimate, it is the 
inextricable relationship between the idea of sovereignty on the one hand and human 
rights on the other, that makes the elaboration of a non-exclusionary, ‘humane’, political 
project peculiarly difficult.  Jameson echoes this observation in a somewhat different way 
in his discussion of the idea of a ‘utopia of full employment’: 
‘As the economic apologists for the system today have tirelessly instructed us, 
capitalism cannot flourish under full employment; it requires a reserve army of 
the unemployed in order to function and to avoid inflation. That first monkey-
wrench of full employment would then be compounded by the universality of 
the requirement, inasmuch as capitalism also requires a frontier, and perpetual 
expansion, in order to sustain its inner dynamic. But at this point the 
utopianism of the demand becomes circular, for it is also clear, not only that 
the establishment of full employment would transform the system, but also 
that the system would have to be already transformed, in advance, in order for 
full employment to be established’.58 
Just as, for Jameson, the social potential of the idea of full employment is dependent 
upon a prior transformation of the system that it seeks to transform, so also the idea of 
social rights might seem dependent upon the prior reconfiguration of the idea of 
sovereign competence in relation to resource distribution that it seeks to bring into 
effect.  Jameson, however, is nonetheless clear as to the significance of the utopia he 
propounds, and his observations are equally pertinent for the project of social rights in 
general, as they are for the specific idea of full employment: 
‘To foreground full employment [social rights] in this way, as the fundamental 
utopian requirement, allows us, indeed, to return to concrete circumstances 
and situations, to read their dark spots and pathological dimensions as so many 
symptoms and effects of this particular root of all evil identified as 
unemployment [dispossession]…. At this point, then, utopian circularity 
becomes both a political vision and programme, and a critical and diagnostic 
instrument.’59 
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